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For decades, civil libertarians and legal scholars have raised
the specter of an "imperial president" hanging ominously over
American constitutional politics. The term itself was famously
coined by Arthur Schlesinger to describe presidential leadership
during the era of Watergate and Vietnam. Writing of executive
authority in 1973, he concluded, "in our own time it has produced
a conception of presidential power so spacious and peremptory as
to imply a radical transformation of the traditional polity... . The
constitutional Presidency . .. has become the imperial Presidency
and threatens to be the revolutionary Presidency."' In the years
immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, fears of an
imperial President only intensified. The Bush White House
unilaterally pursued multiple armed conflicts, established a global
prison system with thousands of individuals arrested and detained,
and asserted inherent (and near limitless) constitutional powers.
In domestic affairs, this involved attaching signing statements to
countless legislative bills, which claimed the right to implement
such laws in keeping with presidential commitments and regardless
of express congressional stipulations. Writing of Bush
administration practices, constitutional scholar-and current
t Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I would to thank
everyone at the Journal of the National Security Forum for all their hard work on this
piece, especially my principal editor Anders Erickson.
1. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGERJR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY Viii (1973).
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Obama administration Acting Solicitor General-Neal Katyal
declared in 2006 that the Presidency had become "the most
dangerous branch," one that "subsumes much of the tripartite
structure of government. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman went so far
as to argue that Bush administration "lawyers [were] building the
constitutional foundation for military despotism."
Thus, for many legal critics of executive power, the election of
Barack Obama as President appeared to herald a new approach to
security concerns and even the possibility of a fundamental break
from Bush-era policies. These hopes were immediately stoked by
Obama's decision before taking office to close the Guantanamo
4Bay prison. Over two years later, however, not only does
Guantanamo remain open, but through a recent executive order
Obama has formalized a system of indefinite detention for those
held there and also has stated that new military commission trials
5
will begin for Guantanamo detainees. More important, in ways
small and large, the new administration remains committed to core
elements of the previous constitutional vision of national security.
Just as their predecessors, Obama officials continue to defend
expansive executive detention and war powers and to promote the
centrality of state secrecy to national security.
The Justice Department has presented sweeping arguments
about executive privilege in order to challenge the ability of courts
to compel the release of classified information. In the context of
the widening war in Afghanistan, the military has increasingly
2. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most
Dangerous Branch From Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006) (discussing the
power of the executive branch after September 11, 2001).
3. BRUCE AcKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACIC PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
AN AGE OF TERRORISM 26 (2006).
4. Obama Team Crafts Plan to Close Gitmo, CBS NEWS (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/11/politics/main4591241.shtml?sourc
e=RSSattr=Politics 4591241.
5. Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, Obama Creates Indefinite Detention System for
Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/07/AR2011030704871.html?hpid=topnews.
6. SeeJosh Gerstein, Obama Takes Stand for Secrecy, Executive Power, POLITICO
(Sept. 3, 2009, 7:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein
/0909/Obamatakesstand for secrecy-executive-power.html. One plaintiff's
lawyer in a case alleging illegal CIA surveillance told reporters, "With respect to
national security litigation and plaintiffs' ability to challenge government
misconduct, virtually nothing has changed since President Obama took office.
The Executive Branch has continued to seek to ensure its power remains absolute
and subject to no outside oversight." Id.
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employed drone attacks to target and kill perceived enemies. As in
the case of one Muslim American cleric living in Yemen, those
potentially subject to attack have even included American citizens
residing outside the battlefield and who deny any involvement in
terrorist activities. Defending the legality of these practices, State
Department lawyers have asserted a broad reading of self-defense
in order to justify the summary lack of process entailed by
8
extrajudicial killings. And while Obama famously issued an
executive order banning torture,9 he has nonetheless maintained
policies of rendition, which allow intelligence and military
personnel to seize suspects and move them to foreign countries
where they will be interrogated-likely through banned methods.
As for the administration's international prison scheme,
Obama officials also maintain that prisoners captured in
Afghanistan (and held at Bagram Air Force Base) do not have the
legal right to challenge their detention in federal court. Even
more strikingly, Obama himself has gone on record to endorse a
general scheme of indefinite preventative detention (beyond the
Guantanamo detainees)-based on neither past violations of law
nor proven crimes-for those that the executive deem to be
security threats.'o In line with such views, policymakers in the
Defense Department have called for a regularized overseas
detention framework for holding a small number of suspects
indefinitely and without trial, after an initial Pentagon designation
as unprivileged enemy belligerents." In fact, officials offer as a
rationale for such detention that at least it provides more process
7. Paula Newton, Al-Awlaki's Father Says Son is "Not Osama bin Laden," CNN
(Jan. 11, 2010, 8:52 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/10
/yemen.al.awlaki.father/index.html; Mark Tran, White House Approves Assassination
of Cleric Linked to Christmas Bomb Plot, GUARDlAN, Apr. 7, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/07/obama-assassination-cleic-
christmas-bombing.
8. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote
Address of the Annual Meeting of American Society of International Law, The
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/s/1/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
9. Foon Rhee, Obama Orders Guantanamo Bay Closed, Bans Torture, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence
/2009/01/obama ordersgu.html.
10. Text: Obama's Speech on National Security, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at 6,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21obama.text.html.
11. David S. Cloud & Julian E. Barnes, New Rules on Terror Custody Being
Drafted, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 15, 2010, http://articles.1atimes.com/2010/apr
/15/nation/la-na-obama-detentionl6-2010aprl6.
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than existing practices of extrajudicial killing. According to one
Bush-era State Department official commenting on Obama
policies, "[w]e are inadvertently creating incentives for people to
be killed rather than captured.. .. And that may be why we are
seeing relatively few people captured.""
The pervasive use of such discretionary and coercive
authority-from rendition to indefinite detention and extrajudicial
killing-suggests that the change in President has not marked a
major improvement in constitutional protections and executive
limitation.13 Indeed, in the context of the bombing campaign in
Libya, the Obama administration has gone so far as to claim the
constitutional prerogative of the executive unilaterally to pursue
military action, even when in violation of congressional restrictions
or the War Powers Resolution.14  This continuity between
administrations raises a central political and legal question: how
can we make sense of the persistent entrenchment of executive
authority regardless of which party holds power?
At root, these developments are the product of a permanent
logic of intervention in American foreign policy, which views
foreign instability-no matter how distant from the United States's
actual borders-as potential threats that must be pacified.
Moreover, this commitment to international police power is widely
shared across the political spectrum and is presumed to be a
foundational element of American politics. While domestic critics
have no doubt challenged the consequences of specific foreign
policy agendas, such as the Vietnam War, Latin American
counterinsurgency in the 1980s, or the post-9/11 War on Terror,
few have challenged the larger framework that made such policies
conceivable and have in turn promoted the centralization of
12. Id.
13. Comparing the presidencies through the analytical tools of just war
theory, Stephen Carter recently has reached similar conclusions, arguing that both
Obama and Bush have operated according to the "American Proviso" whereby
"attacking America is morally different from being attacked by America." See
STEPHEN CARTER, THE VIOLENCE OF PEACE: AMERICA'S WARS IN THE AGE OF OBAMA 69
(2011).
14. According to Democratic Congressman Brad Sherman, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton told House members during a classified briefing that, "[t]he White
House would forge ahead with military action in Libya even if Congress passed a
resolution constraining the mission." See Susan Crabtree, Clinton to Congress:
Obama Would Ignore Your War Resolutions, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 30, 2011,
4:44 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2011/03/clinton-tells-house-
obama-would-ignore-war-resolutions.php.
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executive command. Over the following pages, I plan to describe
how this logic of intervention became tied to the language of
national security in the 1940s and helped to structure a new
national security Constitution premised on increased secrecy and
executive control. I will then discuss the consistent failure of
procedural efforts to reform this institutional infrastructure, and
conclude with some reflections on what would be required at
present to alter these arrangements.
I. PENDLETON HERRING AND THE FORGOTTEN BIRTH OF "NATIONAL
SECURITY"
Prior to the 1940s, the infrastructure undergirding American
national defense held little in common with what we see today.
The State Department dominated the formulation of peacetime
foreign policy and the professional military (represented in
executive branch deliberation by the War Department and the
navy) enjoyed a restricted institutional role in devising policy.
Moreover, the United States had a limited foreign intelligence
network with few actual spies, relying instead on overseas military
attaches, foreign service officials, Americans living abroad, and
members of the press." This approach, which emphasized civilian
control and deemphasized secrecy, was tied to the longstanding
argument in American politics that matters of war and peace
should be decided through transparent and democratic
mechanisms. Such openness was believed to be necessary for
curtailing the ability of centralized actors-particularly in the
executive branch-to make unilateral judgments about defense
and emergency.
Among the very first public intellectuals to challenge this
institutional and ideological status quo was Pendleton Herring, a
key figure in the 1930s and 1940s who today is less well
remembered. Herring was a political science professor in
Harvard's Government Department and later became president of
the American Political Science Association, as well as the first
Secretary of the UN Atomic Energy Agency. During World War II,
he chaired the Committee of Records of the War Administration,
overseeing the publication of The United States at War, the official
government account of the war. In perhaps his most central
15. See DOUGLAS STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURIY STATE: A HISTORY
OF THE LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 34-36 (2008).
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public-policy role, he went on to be one of the primary authors of
the National Security Act of 1947, which fundamentally
reorganized the nature of American civil and military relations and
generated our current defense policy framework. 6
During the Great Depression numerous government officials
and academics argued that economic emergency highlighted the
value of far greater state authority and centralization. As the 1930s
drew to a close and Americans began to focus on international
events, Herring was among the earliest public voices to connect
these arguments about the need for a "positive state" in the
economic domain to similar needs presented by the looming
specter of war. Herring argued that those issues of modern
complexity and permanent threat that plagued domestic economic
life were even more troubling in the context of foreign affairs.
There, the rise of totalitarian regimes meant that the United States
now faced external enemies that, due to ideology, could not be
deterred in the same way as old European rivals. Moreover,
technological improvements-especially the rise of air power-
indicated that the United States was no longer safe behind the
oceans. These scientific developments underscored how domestic
tranquility faced continuous dangers from enemies who could not
be accommodated or reasoned with through arguments about
strategic self-interest. As Herring maintained in his widely read
book, The Impact of War, "In our economic and social life we must
now take on the characteristics of a people living in proximity to
warlike neighbors and engaged in stern competition. The margins
"'17
of safety that our democracy has known are being cut away.
According to him, what made the problems especially perilous was
that totalitarian regimes were better equipped than democracies to
take advantage of new technologies of transportation, warfare, and
even communication. This was because the centralized nature of
fascist or communist states allowed them to aggregate authority in
administrative bodies and to avoid the inefficiencies of mass
deliberation.
For Herring, the only method of overcoming these new
circumstances was to employ the same conceptual and government
structures that had operated during the Great Depression in order
16. See id. at 1-31 for an excellent account of Herring's career and his
influence in structuring new defense practices.
17. PENDLETON HERRING, THE IMPACT OF WAR: OUR AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
UNDERARMS 15-16 (Kennikat Press 1972) (1941).
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to create a permanent institutional infrastructure for responding to
global threats. He began by employing a relatively novel phrase-
"national security" ]-to mirror the domestic discourse of
economic security. Although the term itself had been employed
sparingly before, 9 in the 1930s the phrase was still largely
unfamiliar. In fact, as Mark Neocleous writes, "the multi-volume
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, published b MacMillan in 1934,
contained no entry for 'national security.'" But now, Herring
invoked the phrase to argue that just as economic security was the
dominant domestic objective, "national security"-the protection
of the state and the way of life associated with it-should be
understood as the dominant global objective. The threats to
collective survival meant that defense policy could not be left to the
same special interests and conflicting social forces that so recently
brought the country to financial destitution. Instead the
commitment to national security required a degree of social
cohesiveness and centralized command, which even outstripped
that needed to combat the Depression. According to Herring,
"[a]s a nation we are facing a new world. This means a drastic
change in the context within which our political institutions
operate. Herring sought to reassure critics by arguing that
although he was not calling for the United States simply to mimic
authoritarian states, he nonetheless believed that the country's
leaders could learn from authoritarian methods of shaping policy
and projecting power. "This does not mean that the opponents of
Nazi Germany must become Nazified if they are to resist, but it
does mean that totalitarian states can be o posed only through an
equally effective mobilization of resources."
Herring believed that such mobilization in the name of
national security necessitated a series of basic shifts in the approach
to American foreign relations. Among these shifts was the
18. See id.
19. See STUART, supra note 15, at 28. During World War I, corporations and
pro-war nativists had organized the National Security League, which at its peak in
1918 included 90,000 members across the country. The League became a central
mechanism for enflaming anti-German and then anti-Communist hysteria as well
as in assisting government efforts to suppress general opposition to the war. But
with the end of the Red Scare the League crumbled, and by 1940 the organization
had declared bankruptcy and its leader had their archives burned to avoid public
knowledge of its wartime practices. Id.
20. MAK NEOCLEOUS, CRITIQUE OF SECURITY 77 (2008).
21. HERRING, supra note 17, at 277.
22. Id. at 14.
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importance of both greater executive expansion and a permanent
and established role for professional soldiers in determining
foreign policy goals. Earlier generations of Americans had believed
that civilian command and democratic deliberation were essential
to sustaining popular accountability and to avoiding the specter of
military despotism. Now, however, Herring asserted that, "if
democratic governments are to cope with the world today the
military must have an accepted place in our scheme of values.""
Only members of the military had the knowledge to make sense of
specialized questions of preparedness, questions crucial to long-
term strategic thinking.
Moreover, undergirding such centralization and military
influence was a focus on secrecy and a rejection of old
presumptions in favor of political transparency and public access.
In order to respond to threats from abroad, the state needed to
remain one step ahead of its potential enemies. This entailed
developing a new formalized network of spies as well as linguistic
and technological experts skilled in collecting and sifting through
intelligence. In essence, this national security framework-built on
centralization, military influence, and institutional secrecy-took
for granted that, just as insecurity was a permanent condition of
economic life, it also was a constant element of international
politics. As such, Herring concluded that Americans had to
reconcile themselves, regardless of old fears of military and
executive dominance, to the fact that permanent crisis meant,
"[d]emocracy may have to remain under arms for a long time to
come."24
Above all, Herring's account entailed treating national security
as a unifying commitment, one that transcended ordinary popular
disagreement and thus was appropriately removed from the regular
political process. According to him, if threats had now become
continuous and ever present, it was also the case that, "[a]
democracy can stand under arms and remain true to its values to
the extent that it can call upon deep communal reserves of
agreement. For Herring, while the United States should remain
an open society, he nonetheless concluded that, "[n]o internal
resistances to these domestic efforts can be tolerated."26  As a
23. Id. at 20.
24. Id. at 277.
25. Id. at 282.
26. Id. at 14.
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consequence, if a balance between liberty and security must be
struck, security had to enjoy primacy of place as both pre-political
and the foundation of American unity.
Herring's national security vision was especially persuasive in
the wake of World War II. To Washington policymakers, his
arguments in The Impact of War appeared particularly prescient
given that they were published only months before Pearl Harbor,
an event that, for many political commentators, shattered the old
faith in domestic safety behind the oceans. The National Security
Act of 1947, aptly using Herring's phrase, gave legal substance to
many of his ambitions. As historian Douglas Stuart writes of the
law:
It created a National Military Establishment, which
became the Department of Defense in 1949. It gave the
Air Force an independent status and provided the Joint
Chiefs of Staff with statutory identity. It established the
National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and a cluster of lesser-known institutions,
including the National Security Resource Board, the
Munitions Board, and the Research and Development
Board.
Among the long-term implications of these changes was the
creation of a permanent peacetime structure for gathering
intelligence, the elevation of the policymaking responsibility of
military officers, and the dramatic growth of executive agencies
tasked with issues of defense.
The new ideological and institutional status quo meant that by
the early 1950s, even Supreme Court decisions, which on their face
appeared to limit executive discretion, had the practical effect of
further expanding presidential power, as well as the emerging
national security framework. For instance, a case such as
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer," commonly read as a
powerful example of the Court limiting presidential prerogatives,
highlighted precisely the opposite developments. There, the Court
invalidated President Truman's seizure of private steel mills during
the Korean War, holding that he lacked either the statutory or
constitutional authority to do so, especially given Congress's
27. STUART, supra note 15, at 8.
28. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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explicit refusal to delegate this power when passing 1947's Taft-
Hartley Act.9 Despite the formalism of Justice Black's opinion for
the court (no opinion received a majority of votes), six of the nine
judges contended that the executive may have inherent emergency
powers and five of the nine defended implied executive powers of
lawmaking given congressional acquiescence. More important, as
Jules Lobel notes, "the concurrences of Justice Jackson and Justice
Frankfurter, rather than the formalism of Justice Black's majority
opinion, now dominate[] the national security establishment's view
of the Constitution.",3
While Black emphasized textualism and clear formal
categories of legality and illegality, Jackson and Frankfurter's
concurrences reiterated that the Constitution had to be read as a
functional document. For Frankfurter, this meant that
congressional acquiescence to executive practice had the potential
to create a presumption in favor of constitutionality, in effect
providing the President with legally-sanctioned lawmaking powers.
Quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Frankfurter explicitly rejected
Black's textual approach and declared that "l[t] he great ordinances
of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white."32 According to him, the Constitution had to be understood
29. Justice Black's court opinion held that because Congress did not
authorize executive action, the President did not have the constitutional authority
during the Korean War to seize and operate private steel mills. "The Founders of
this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both good
and bad times." Id. at 589.
30. With respect to inherent emergency powers-loosely understood to be
those powers furthest away from a clear grant of constitutional or statutory
authority-along with the three justices in dissent (Vinson, Reed, and Minton)
Justices Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter also offered telling defenses of presidential
assertiveness. Clark wrote that, "the Constitution does grant to the President
extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency. In fact,
to my thinking, such a grant may well be necessary to the very existence of the
Constitution itself." Id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring). Burton maintained the
legitimacy of inherent authority when facing an imminent attack, commenting,
"[t]he present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or
threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what might be the President's
constitutional power to meet such catastrophic situations." Id. at 659 (Burton, J.,
concurring). As for Frankfurter, he commented that, "[w]e must therefore put to
one side consideration of what powers the President would have had if there had
been no legislation whatever bearing on the authority asserted by the seizure, or if
the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period . . . ." Id. at 597
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
31. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1410 (1989).
32. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 597, quoted in Lobel, supra note 31, at 1411.
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in the context of contemporary problems, and as capable of
contracting or extending its allocation of authority based on
society's needs. He maintained that " [i] t is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the
words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has
written upon them.",3  Thus, whether assertions of executive and
congressional power were constitutionally legitimate shifted with
the practical realities on the ground and the perceived judgments
about external threats. For Frankfurter, the Constitution was to be
understood as a flexible document, one which catered to
policymaking judgments about the requirements of national
security.
II. AMERICAN PRIMACY AND THE FAILURE OF PROCEDURAL
REFORM
Many of today's defenders of this national security
constitution-imagined by Herring and given institutional and
legal form in the 1940s and 1950s-often present these changes as
simple responses to unavoidable conditions of objective threat. Just
as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland
justifying a new framework, the American position in the world
since has been one of continuous insecurity in the face of new,
equally objective dangers. According to this view, the reason for
continuity between Obama and Bush is the straightforward
consequence of the persistence of these externally generated crises.
Yet, from its inception, supporters of the national security
framework also have noted the link between the idea of insecurity
and American's post-World War II role of global primacy, one that
has only expanded following the Cold War. In 1961, none other
than SenatorJames William Fulbright declared that the imperatives
of national security meant that "our basic constitutional machinery,
admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the
18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century
nation."3 For Fulbright, at the heart of this national security vision
was the importance of sustaining the country's "preeminen [ce] in
political and military power."5  Moreover, Fulbright held that
33. Youngstown, 343 U.S at 610 (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
34. J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th Century Under an
18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1 (1961).
35. Id.
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greater executive action and war-making powers were necessary
precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all
the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power."
Fulbright felt that the United States had both a right and a duty to
suppress those forms of chaos and disorder, which existed at the
edges of American authority. Thus, rather than being purely
objective, the American condition of permanent external threat
was itself deeply tied to political calculations about national identity
and the value of global primacy. What generated the condition of
continual danger was not only technological change, but also the
belief that the United States' own sense of national security rested
on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of
foreign states.
It is the failure to reckon with this political dimension of the
national security Constitution that largely explains the inadequacy
of efforts since the 1940s to address the problems of executive
authority, heightened centralization, and pervasive secrecy. As the
opening quote from Schlesinger makes clear, today's critics of the
37imperial President are hardly the first to raise such worries.
Instead, these critics are part of a sixty-year history of reform aimed
at limiting presidential prerogative and preventing likely abuses.
What is remarkable about such reform efforts is that in every
generation scholars and politicians have articulated the same basic
anxieties and presented virtually identical procedural solutions.
These solutions have focused on enhancing the institutional
strength of both Congress and the courts to rein in executive
prerogatives. They either promote new statutory schemes that
codify legislative responsibilities or call for greater court activism.
As early as the 1940s, Clinton Rossiter argued that only a clearly
established legal framework in which Congress enjoyed the power
to declare and terminate states of emergency would prevent
executive tyranny in times of crisis. 9 After the Iran-Contra scandal,
Harold Koh, now State Department Legal Adviser, once more
raised this approach, calling for passage of a national security
36. Id.
37. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
39. See CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 297, 306-13 (1948). According to
Rossiter, "[i]f Congress is to play a salutary part in future emergency governments
in this country, then its functions of legislation, investigation, and control must be
streamlined and strengthened." Id. at 309.
5110 [Vol. 37:5
TEN QUESTIONS: RANA
charter, which explicitly enumerated the powers of the executive
and the legislature, and promoted greater balance between the
40branches. More recently, Bruce Ackerman has defended the
need for an emergency constitution premised on congressional
oversight. As for greater judicial vigilance, Schlesinger argued
over thirty years ago that the courts "had to reclaim their own
dignity and meet their own responsibilities" by abandoning
deference and by offering a meaningful check on presidential
power.4 Today, Lawrence Tribe and Patrick Gudridge once more
hope that, by providing a powerful voice of dissent, the courts can
play a critical role in balancing the branches. They write that
adjudication can "generate []-even if largely (or, at times, only) in
eloquent and cogently reasoned dissent-an apt language for
potent criticism.,,4
None of these calls to action, in either their older or more
recent forms, have presented a meaningful check on national
security practices. "Instead, presidential and military prerogatives
continue to expand even when the courts or Congress intervene.
The ultimate result is often to entrench further the system of
discretion and centralization. In essence, today's scholarship finds
itself mired in an argumentative loop, representing inadequate
remedies and seemingly incapable of recognizing past failures.
The hope-returned to by scholars for the last sixty years-has
been that by creating procedures for strengthening the other
branches, executive abuse can be stemmed.4 What leaves this hope
40. See generally HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURIlY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990). Koh wrote at the time that:
What the Iran-Contra affair underscores is the need for a new
national security charter-an omnibus statutory amendment to the
National Security Constitution-in the form of a framework statute
designed to regulate and protect many aspects of the foreign-policy-
making process. Unlike the current patchwork of laws, executive orders,
national security directives, and informal accords that govern covert and
overt war making, emergency economic power, foreign intelligence, and
arms sales, such a statute would act as a successor to the National Security
Act of 1947.
Id. at 157 (endnote omitted).
41. See AcKERMAN, supra note 3, at 19 ("Congress and the public [need to be
invited] to make the necessary discriminations [on presidential military powers]").
42. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 418 ("[admonishing also] Congress, ....
the executive establishment, the press, the universities, [and] public opinion").
43. Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution,
113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1846 (2004).
44. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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perpetually unrealized is that the ideal of national security-
articulated so powerfully by Herring-takes for granted the need
for constitutional flexibility. Only through the exercise of such
flexibility can the United States assert authority abroad and
intervene continuously to pacify emerging and perceived sources of
instability. Since the executive branch (armed with the expertise of
the professional military) is presumed to embody the institution
best equipped to exercise this constitutional flexibility, the other
branches necessarily face a legitimacy deficit. Under the realities of
national security, whenever Congress or the courts intercede to
limit executive power they inevitably do so on shaky grounds.
Thus, the tendency of procedural reform efforts has been to place
greater decision making in the other branches and then to watch
those branches delegate such power back to the Presidency.
In the case of congressional legislation (from the 200 standby
statutes on the books to the post-9/11 and Iraq War Authorizations
for the Use of Military Force to the Detainee Treatment Act and
the Military Commissions Acts), this has often entailed Congress
self-consciously playing the role of junior partner-buttressing
executive practices by extending its own constitutional imprimatur
to them. As just one example, the USA PATRIOT Act, while no
doubt politically controversial, has been renewed by Congress for
ten consecutive years without any meaningful checks. In fact,
following the most recent renewal (for three months), the Obama
administration is on record declaring it would like a longer-term
extension and the Senate debate has principally concerned
whether the Act should be renewed for three years or made
permanent. In essence, current practices have meant the
internalization of emergency norms within the ordinary operation
of American constitutional politics.46 This internalization takes the
form of statutes and administrative procedures that provide legal
underpinning for the executive's expansive and coercive powers.
45. See Pete Kasperowicz, Obama Signs Patriot Act Extension into Law, THE HILL
(Feb. 25, 2011, 3:42 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/146173-
obama-signs-patriot-act-extension-into-law; Pete Kasperowicz, Senate Returns to
Patriot Act Extension Next Week, THE HILL (Feb. 25, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house/ 1461 33-senate-returns-to-patriot-
act-extension-next-week.
46. For more on the normalization of emergency in American law, see Kim L.
Scheppele, Exceptions that Prove the Rule: Embedding Emergency Government in Everyday
Constitutional Life, in THE LImrs OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 124 (Jeffrey K.
Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., 2010).
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III. CONCLUSION: BREAKING OUT OF THE ARGUMENTATIVE
LOOP
The only way ultimately to produce lasting reform is to shift
American political identity away from the national security frame
shared by both the Bush and Obama administrations. In
emphasizing the sense of permanent threat, this frame has not only
generated an American polity continuously under arms, but it has
also led to a global military footprint perhaps unparalleled in
human history. As of 2009, some 516,273 military service
members-not including Department of Defense civilian officials-
were deployed abroad, stationed across 716 reported overseas bases
(the true number is likely over 1000), and present in approximatey
150 foreign states (nearly eighty percent of the world's countries).
This worldwide military network is sustained by tremendous
expenditures, which account for almost half of global defense
spending-a number equal to the following twenty nations
combined. 48 Simply maintaining and protecting this global defense
infrastructure has the inevitable consequence of strengthening
executive power and promoting the further entrenchment of
emergency rhetoric and rationales.
Most troubling, in order to extend its footprint and
international primacy, the United States finds itself engaging in
practices that often actually promote, rather than inhibit, instability
at the fringes of American power. The ever-present concern with
national security means that policymakers view the United States as
enjoying a right to act covertly or overtly in all parts of the world in
order to quell presumed threats. Yet, in doing so, American
actions have the tendency to produce their own backlashes, with
the United States subject to local insurrections and new potential
dangers. Rather than recognizing how the projection of American
power itself participates in generating these crises, the talismanic
logic of national security works to rationalize yet further territorial
presence. This cycle of intervention, backlash, instability, and
47. See Deployment of U.S. Troops, UNITED PRESS INT'L ONLINE (Dec. 2, 2009,
1:01 PM), http://www.upi.com/TopNews/Special/2009/12/02/Deployment-of-
US-troops/UPI-93091259776903/;
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF., DEP'T OF DEF., BASE STRUCTURE
REPORT DOD-22 (2009), available at http://www.defense.gov
/pubs/pdfs/2009baseline.pdf.
48. See STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., SIPRI YEARBOOK 2009 app. 5A
(2009), available at http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/05/05A.
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more intervention promotes a deep distortion in the actual
meaning of local events-which oftentimes have little direct
relation to American interests. It also serves as a continual
justification for yet further constitutional flexibility and presidential
prerogative, precisely because new dangers seem omnipresent.
One clear consequence is that, as the local meaning of events
disappears, the actual severity of foreign threats can often be
greatly exaggerated. In 2009, only twenty-five United States
civilians (sixteen at home and nine abroad) were killed in terrorist
49
attacks according to the State Department. While the fear of a
terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, such numbers-which have
been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in
perspective and suggest the disconnect between the rhetoric of
existential danger (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor)
and the reality of relative security. Moreover, the persistent
alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims,
regardless of objective consequences, for actual American physical
safety, speaks to a profound imbalance in the United States's
political priorities. It highlights just how entrenched Herring's old
vision of security as pre-political (a lodestar around which to
calibrate fundamental rights and collective interests) has become.
Ultimately, the failure of the Obama administration to offer a
meaningful legal correction is because at root the current
administration-like its predecessor-remains committed to this
vision of security and to the larger political framework produced by
it. Thus, the question for Americans is whether there exists the
public will to challenge the prevailing consensus, with its account
of permanent threat and the need for a continuous projection of
American power. Without such a will, there can be no substantive
shift in our constitutional politics.
49. See NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., 2009 REPORT ON TERRORISM 19 (2010),
available at http://www.nctc.gov/witsbanner/docs/2009_report~on-terrorism.pdf.
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